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I. Introduction
The significant increase in the number of international investment
agreements (TJAs) over the past two decades has been accompanied by a
meteoric rise in the number of investor-state disputes.' In 2015 alone, 77
investor-state arbitrations were initiated, the highest number of cases in a
single year and significantly up from the 58 arbitrations initiated in the
previous year.2 The Asia-Pacific region itself has witnessed a startling
number of investment disputes; about 21 percent of all investment disputes
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1. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEv. (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2016,
Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges, at xii, U.N. Sales No. E.16.I.D.4 (2016) [hereinafter
"WIR 2016"] (noting that the number of investor-state arbitrations in 2015 set a new annual
high); U.N. CONE. ON TrADE & DEv. (UNCTAD), IIA Issues Note No. 2, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: Review of Developments in 2015, 38, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2016/4 (June
2016) [hereinafter "HA Issues Note 2"]; Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn & Runar Hilleren Lie,
The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration, 20 J. INT'L EcON. L. 301, 307 (2017);
Umakrishnan Kollamparambil, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investor State Disputes 1, 1-2
(Econ. Research South Africa, Working Paper No. 589, 2016), https://econrsa.org/system/files/
publications/working-papers/working-paper.58
9 .pdf (concluding based on empirical analysis
that investors initiate a higher number of cases against countries with bilateral investment
treaties).
2. WIR 2016, supra note 1, at xii; IIA Issues Note 2, supra note 1, at 1-2; U.N. CONE. ON
TRADE & DEv. (UNCTAD), IIA Issues Note No. 1, Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS, 1, 5,
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2015/1 (Feb. 2015). This is the number of publicly known cases.
As a significant number of cases are conducted in a confidential framework, the actual number
of disputes is likely to be higher.
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involve Asian states.3 The vast majority of claims are against India (twenty-
two), making it the eleventh highest sued country in the world, followed by
Kazakhstan (eighteen) and Kyrgyzstan (thirteen) in the Asia-Pacific.4
Several authors foretell a greater number of disputes involving Asian parties,
mainly because of the rising number of IIAs in parallel with increasing FDI
flows, coupled with a greater awareness of investment rules shown by Asian
actors.5
While international arbitration remains the preferred mechanism for
resolving disputes between an investor and a state,6 several states
disenchanted with, or simply critical of, investment arbitration are proposing
viable alternatives.7 Several states are redefining the current investor-state
arbitration framework and its relationship to democratic decision-making.
In fact, the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement contemplates the creation of
an "investment court" that would resolve disputes between investors and
Member States.8 Other states have chosen to significantly reduce the scope
3. Proportion of investment disputes involving Asian states compared to all investment
disputes, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, U.N. CoNE. ON TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (follow "advanced search" hyperlink; then enter
respondent's nationality as "Asia," dates of initiation as "1980 to 2016," and "Search"; see total
number of cases loaded; then compare to results from enter respondent's nationality as
"World," dates of initiation as "1980 to 2016," and "Search") (last visited Sept. 25, 2017). See
also Julien Chaisse, Assessing the Exposure of Asian States to Investment Claims, 6 CoNTEMP. ASIA
ARB. J. 187, 202-03 (2013) (concluding that more than ninety investment disputes involving
twenty-four Asia-Pacific states were filed since 1987). Dr. Chaisse's study did not include cases
involving Asian investors, or claims filed from 2014 to 2017.
4. Number of claims against states, and rank among states, Investment Dispute Settlement
Navigator, U.N. CoNF. ON TRADE & DEv. (UNCTAD), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.
org/ISDS (follow "COUNTRY" hyperlink; then toggle "Cases as Respondent State" to
descending order) (last visited Sept. 25, 2017).
5. See Julien Chaisse, The Shifting Tectonics of International Investment Law-Structure and
Dynamics of Rules and Arbitration on Foreign Investment in the Asia-Pacific Region, 47 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REv. 563, 567, 612 (2015); Julien Chaisse, Assessing the Exposure of Asian States to
Investment Claims, 6 CoNTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 187, 206 (2013); Joongi Kim, A Pivot to Asia in
Investor-State Arbitration: The Coming Emergence of Asian Claimants, 27 ICSID REv. 399, 400,
415 (2012); Sam Luttrell, ISDS in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional Snap-shot, 19 INT'L TRADE Bus. L.
REV. 20, 21 (2016); Loretta Malintoppi, Is there an "Asian Way" for Investor-State Dispute
Resolution?, KUALA LuMuUR REGIONAL CTR. FOR ARB. NEWSL. No. 19 (Kuala Lumpur
Regional Ctr. for Arb., Kuala Lumpur, Malay.), July-Sept. 2015, at 16-17, 20.
6. See generally Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements,
12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 174-75, 184 (2005) (noting that foreign investors are
increasingly resorting to international arbitration to resolve their disputes with host states).
7. See Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Diana Rosert, Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Opportunities to Reform Arbitral Rules and Processes, at 2, 11-17, INT'L INsr. FOR SUsTAINABLE
DEV. (IISD), IISD Report (Jan. 2014).
8. On February 1, 2016, the text of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement was published,
following the announcement of the conclusion of the negotiations. The legal review of the text
has now begun and will be followed by translation into the EU's official languages and
Vietnamese. The Commission will then present a proposal to the Council of Ministers for
approval of the agreement and ratification by the European Parliament. European Commission
Press Release, The EU and Vietnam finalise landmark trade deal (Dec. 2 2015), http://
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of issues that can be submitted to arbitration,9 while still others require such
disputes to be submitted first to their own domestic courts.10
In addition, the G20 recently released its "Guiding Principles for Global
Investment Policymaking" (G20 Principles), which insist that "[i]nvestment
policies should provide legal certainty and strong protection to investors and
investments, tangible and intangible, including access to effective
mechanisms for the prevention and settlement of disputes, as well as to
enforcement procedures."11 The Principles also emphasize the importance
of adequate and modem dispute resolution mechanisms: "[d]ispute
settlement procedures should be fair, open and transparent, with appropriate
safeguards to prevent abuse."12 While the ramifications of the Principles
have yet to be seen, it is expected that they will have a significant resonance
in the Asia-Pacific region.
In this scenario, with the Asia-Pacific region also witnessing record
foreign investment inflows and outflows,13 it is timely to review current
trends, concerns, and recent developments in investment arbitration,
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1409. See Michael P. Daly & Jawad Ahmad, The
EU-Vietnam FTA: What Does It All Mean? What Does It Mean for the Future?, KLUWER
ARBITRATION BLOG (Dec. 14, 2015), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/12/14/the-eu-
vietnam-fta-what-does-it-all-mean-what-does-it-mean-for-the-future/. An investment court is
also contemplated under the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement.
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Can.-EU, art 8.29, Oct. 30, 2016,
2017 OJ. (L 11) 23.
9. U.N. CoNF. ON TRADE & DEv. (UNCTAD), Investor-State Dispute Settlement: UNCTAD
Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements I, 16, 43, UNTAD/DIAE/IA/2013/2
(2014) (noting a recent trend of "more circumscribed" IIA dispute settlement provisions, and
citing the Malaysia-Pakistan Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (2007) which excludes all
disputes concerning national treatment and performance requirements as an example). See also
WIR 2016, supra note 1, at 110-12, 175 (noting that Indonesia's draft Model BIT is
"characterized by carve-outs, safeguards[,] and clarifications").
10. An example of such is India's 2015 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, which the
Government proposed in response to the high number of investment treaty arbitration claims
pending against it at the time. MODEL TEXT FOR THE INDIAN BILATERAL INV. TREArY art.
14.3(i)-(ii), (v) (GOVT OF INDIA, Treaty Proposal 2015) ("The Parties agree that the ...
exhaustion of domestic remedies . . . [is a] condition[] precedent to the submission of the
dispute to arbitration."); Ashutosh Ray, Unveiled: Indian Model BIT, KLUWER ARBITRATION
BLOG (Jan. 18, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/01/18/unveiled-indian-model-
bit/.
11. The G20's Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking were agreed upon at
the Group's Trade Ministers' Meeting in Shanghai, China during July 9-10, 2016. The official
statement following the meeting reinforced the Ministers' determination to "promote inclusive,
robust[,] and sustainable trade and investment growth." Group of Twenty ["G20"], G20 Trade
Ministers Meeting Statement, T 3, Shanghai Meeting (July 9-10, 2016), http://g20chn.org/
English/Documents/Current/201607/t20160715_3057.html. The Principles provide guidance
for investment policymaking, and are non-binding. They seek to promote inclusive economic
growth, sustainable development, and coherence in national and international investment policy
resulting in an open and transparent global policy environment that is conducive to investment.
Id. at Annex III: G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking.
12. See id., at Annex III.
13. WIR 2016, supra note 1, at 197-98.
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particularly as they affect the region. Section II of this Article briefly
introduces IAs and investment arbitration. Section III outlines current
trends and concerns, focusing on the Asia-Pacific. Section IV reviews global
developments in the traditional investment arbitration framework and
examines their reception in the region. Section V concludes.
H1. IIAs and Investment Arbitration
HAs may be broadly understood as treaties between sovereign states to
protect and promote investments made by investors from one state in the
territory of the other.14 They are entered into with the aim of mutual
development of both states by inter alia promising a stable and predictable
business environment5 IIAs may take the form of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs)-i.e. treaties between two states (such as the India-Australia
BIT), or investment chapters in broader economic agreements (like Chapter
9 of the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement).16
A. HAs AND INVESTMENT ARBYTRATION
IAs are now ubiquitous, and the global network of HAs has grown
considerably over the past years. It now consists of over 3,322 treaties,
thirty-seven of which were concluded in 2016.17 By the end of 2016, 150
economies were engaged in negotiating new IIAs.18
Asian states have been prolific in entering into IIAs.19 More than half of
investment treaties in the world involve at least one Asian state.20 In 2016
and 2017, three Asian states concluded the highest number of IlAs.21
14. See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 129-30 (2003).
15. Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 157-58, 161-62, 175-78, 183-85. See also International
Investment Agreements (lAs), UNCTAD.ORG, http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International
%20Investment%2OAgreements%20(IIA)/International-Investment-Agreements-(IIAs).aspx
(last visited Sept. 8, 2017).
16. See e.g., Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government
of the People's Republic of China, Austl.-China, ch. 9, June 17, 2015, [2015] ATS 15;
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of India
on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-India, Feb. 26, 1999, [2000] ATS 14
(no longer in force; terminated by India Mar. 23, 2017). See generally Julien Chaisse &
Christian Bellak, Navigating the Expanding Universe of International Treaties en Foreign
Investment-Creation and Use of a Critical Index, 18 J. INT'L EcON. L. 79, 85-88 (2015).
17. WIR 2016, supra note 1, at 101.
18. Id.
19. See Chaisse, The Shifting Tectonics ofInternational Investment Law, supra note 5, at 567-69.
20. Emma Lindsay & Bieta Andemariam, International Investment Arbitration in Asia: Year in
Review 2015, BRYAN CAVE 1, 6 (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g
=ecbl496d-aO5a-4841-a2c6-703ac8494813.
21. WIR 2016, supra note 1, at 101 (noting thatJapan, the Republic of Korea, and China were
among the "most active" in concluding IIAs).
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B. INVESTMENT ARBTIRATION
Investment arbitration-also known as investor-state arbitration-is a
mechanism through which foreign investors may obtain a binding
adjudication of their claims against host states that have either violated IIA
obligations or, in some circumstances, have breached their contractual
commitments or their national foreign investment laws.22
As we mentioned above, investment arbitration is by far the most popular
mechanism for resolving investor-state disputes.23 Indeed, investment
arbitration is attractive from an investor's perspective as it allows the
investor to make a claim without having to rely on its home state24 to initiate
inter-state proceedings against the host state25 for a violation of the latter's
treaty obligations. This is in stark contrast to the dispute resolution
procedures of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that only allow
Member States to initiate proceedings against other Member States in the
event of a violation.26 Investment arbitration is attractive to states too, as it
improves the investment climate of the host state, making it easier for the
host state to attract foreign investment.27
There is no single global forum under which investor-state disputes are
conducted.28 The majority of such disputes are conducted under the
procedural framework of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention)
and the ICSID Arbitration Rules.29 The next most popular procedural
framework for resolving disputes is the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.30
Unlike ICSID, the UNCITRAL framework has no formal or permanent
institutional support, and the contracting states to the IIA need not be




23. U.N. CoNF. ON TRADE & DEv. (UNCTAD), IIA Issues Note No. 1, Recent Trends in IIAs
and ISDS, 1, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2015/1 (Feb. 2015). See also WIR 2016, supra note
1, at xii; IHA Issues Note 2, supra note 1, at 1-2.
24. 'Home state' refers to the investor's state of nationality.
25. 'Host state' refers to the state in which the investment is made.
26. See Giorgio Sacerdoti, Trade and Investment Law: Institutional Differences and Substantive
Similarities, 9 JRSLM. REV. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (2014). See generally Julien Chaisse, Deconstructing
the WTO Conformity Obligation: A Theory of Compliance as a Process, 38 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 57
(2015).
27. See Stephen E. Blythe, The Advantages of Investor-State Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution
Mechanism in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 47 Irr'L L. 273, 277-78 (2013).
28. Miriam Sapiro, Transatlantic trade and investment negotiations: Reaching a consensus on
investor-state dispute settlement, BROOIGINGS.coM, at 3 (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.brookings.
edu/research/transatlantic-trade-and-investment-negotiations-reaching-a-consensus-on-
investor-state-dispute-settlement/.
29. IIA Issues Note 2, supra note 1, at 4 (finding that 62 percent of all known cases have been
filed under the ICSID Convention or ICSID Additional Facility Rules).
30. Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Diferences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT'L STUD. Q. 1, 4-5 (2010).
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parties to the ICSID Convention.31 For states like India that have not
ratified the ICSID Convention, initiating a dispute under the UNCITRAL
framework is an option available to investors.32
Investment arbitration awards frequently run into several million U.S.
dollars>3 Despite this, states tend to comply with them, arguably because
the economic costs of non-compliance are higher than compliance.34 For
instance, non-payment of an ICSID award may restrict a state's ability to
access World Bank funding.35 Further, in non-ICSID contexts, non-
compliance may significantly impact a state's sovereign risk rating, in turn
increasing its borrowing costs.36 Other consequences could be equally
severe: in 2012, the U.S. suspended Argentina's preferential trade status due
to its failure to comply with two investment arbitration awards.37
Having broadly set out the contours of the IIA and investment arbitration
framework, we now turn to examine trends, concerns, and developments in
this framework.
I][. Investment Arbitration: Trends and Concerns
The first investment arbitration arising out of an IIA was filed in 1987 by
a Hong Kong corporation against an Asian state, Sri Lanka.38 Since then,
31. Some level of institutional support is offered by The Hague. See UNCITRAL Endorses the
Hague Principles, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw (July 8, 2015),
https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=414.
32. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps. [ICSID], List of Contracting States and Other
Signatories of the Convection on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, at 2, ICSID Doc. ICSID/3 (as of Apr. 12, 2016), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/
Documents/icsiddocs/List%20of/o20Contracting%20States%20and%200ther%20Signatories
%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%20Latest.pdf (India is not listed as a signatory or
contracting state of the Convention.).
33. Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, Predicting Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
65 DUKE L. J. 459, 459 (2015).
34. Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty
Violations on Foreign Direct Investment, 65 INT'L ORG. 401, 425 (2011).
35. U.S. Will Vote Against Loans to Argentina in World Bank and IDB, MERCOPRESS (Sept. 29,
2011), http://en.mercopress.com/2011/09/29/us-will-vote-against-loans-to-argentina-in-world-
bank-and-idb.
36. Jorge Vifluales & Dolores Bentolila, The Use ofAlternative (Non-judicial) Means to Enforce
Investment Awards Against States, DIPLOMATIC AND JUDICIAL MEANS OF DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: ASSESSING THEIR INTERACTIONS 263 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes,
Marcelo G. Kohen, & Jorge E. Vifluales eds., 2012).
37. Charles B. Rosenberg, The Intersection of International Trade and International Arbitration:
The Use of Trade Benefits to Secure Compliance with ArbitralAwards, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 503, 504
(2013).
38. INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. Disps. (ICSID), ICSID 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, at
9, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID-AR16_EnglishCRA-bl2_
spreads.pdf. See Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award, ¶ 1 (June 15, 1990), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ital034.pdf.
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there have been over 800 investment claims.39 Significantly however, a
recent study found that no investment dispute has arisen under more than 90
percent of the BITs presently in force.40 This Section reviews the global
trends in order to assess the significance of the ISA related developments in
the Asia-Pacific region.
A. GLOBAL TRENDs
The large number of investment claims led to the undertaking of studies
meant to identify and analyse trends in investment arbitration. While these
studies have not always reached the same conclusion (because of different
units of analysis and different sources of data), they largely conclude that
most disputes are decided in favour of the state.41
According to a study recently conducted by UNCTAD, 495 investor-state
proceedings have been concluded up to 2016.42 Of these, a quarter were
settled, approximately one-third were decided in favour of the state, and
about one-fourth were decided in favour of the investor43 About half the
cases that were favourable to states were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.44
Where cases moved beyond jurisdiction to the merits (i.e. where a tribunal
made a determination of whether the state breached any of the HAs
substantive obligations), 60 percent were decided in favour of the investor
and 40 percent in favour of the state.45
In another study, Franck and Wylie observed that states "win"46
approximately 60.4 percent of the time and investors "win" approximately
39.6 percent of the time.47 Miller and Hicks came to largely similar
conclusions: about one-third investment claims settle amicably, and for
those that are not settled, states generally win twice as many times as
investors.48 Further, they conclude that when investors do prevail, they are
39. Daniel Behn, Tarald Laudal Berge & Malcolm Langford, Poor States or Poor Governance?
Explaining Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 37 Nw. J. ITr'L L. & Bus. (forthcoming
2017) (manuscript at 9), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2978546.
40. Scott Miller & Greg Hicks, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Reality Check 7 (Ctr. for
Strategic & Int'l Stud., Working Paper, 2014), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/
legacy.files/files/publication/141029 investor-statedispute settlement.pdf.
41. See WIR 2016, supra note 1, at 107 (but, in cases decided on the merits the investor
prevails 60 percent of the time); IIA Issues Note 2, supra note 1, at 5; Rachel L. Wellhausen,
Recent Trends in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 7 J. INT'L DisP. SETrLFEAvrr 117, 118 (2016);
supra note 33, at 459 (2015).
42. WIR 2016, supra note 1, at 107.
43. Id.; IIA Issues Note 2, supra note 1, at 5.
44. WIR 2016, supra note 1, at 107.
45. Id.; IIA Issues Note 2, supra note 1, at 1.
46. A 'win' for the investor is defined as the awarding of one U.S. dollar or more, even if de
minimus or less than the investor's unrecovered expenses, to the claimant. A 'win' for a state is
when the preceding does not occur. Franck & Wylie, supra note 33, at 485.
47. Id. at 489-90.
48. Miller & Hicks, supra note 40, at 1.
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usually awarded a small fraction of their initial claim-usually less than 10
percent of the amounts claimed.49
The most recent study of 676 public international investment arbitrations
filed from the 1990's too reached similar conclusions: cases are settled about
one-third of the time, and states win more than one-third of disputed cases.50
While this empirical analysis has been criticised by some, it cannot be
denied that states overall have been more successful than investors in
investment arbitration, a conclusion that undermines arguments that the
investment arbitration system is biased in favour of investors.s'
B. TRENDs IN AsIA
Unlike the global trends in investment arbitration considered above, it is
difficult to identify particular trends in investment arbitration in Asia.
Prominent scholars have often reached contradictory conclusions.
In terms of the likely number of investment claims involving Asia, in 2012,
Nottage and Weeramantry predicted that there would be few Asia-centric
claims possibly because of institutional barriers-including costs and a
paucity of experienced counsel and arbitrators in Asia-rather than any
specific cultural aversion to adversarial forms of dispute resolution (such as
arbitration).52 A study conducted a few months later, however, reached a
different conclusion. Citing the higher number of claims seen in 2011, it
predicted that the future would see more claims against Asian states as well
as claims being made by Asian investors.ss
In 2015, Chaisse conducted a comprehensive review of investor-state
claims involving the Asia-Pacific. Like the other studies mentioned above,
he noted a sharp jump in 2011 (ten claims, compared to five each year over
the previous decade), which was maintained in 2012 and 2013 (thirteen
claims each).54 He observed that the growth in investment claims could be
explained by increased FDI, a larger number of IIAs, as well as a better
understanding of these instruments by both Asian states and Asian
investors.55 He too predicted an increasing number of claims involving
Asia.56 Other authors have come to the same conclusion, while others
49. Id.
50. Rachel L. Wellhausen, Recent Trends in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 7 J. INT'L DIsP.
SETLFIENT 117, 118 (2016).
51. For an analysis of the limits of empirical research in answering legal questions, see Gus Van
Harten, Summary of G. Van Harten, "The Use of Quantitative Methods to Examine Possible Bias in
Investment Arbitration" and "Reply" [to Franck, Garbin, and Perkins], in THE YEARBOOK ON
INrERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & PoUcY 2010-2011 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012), http://
digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/all papers/33/.
52. Luke Nottage & J. Romesh Weeramantry, Investment Arbitration in Asia: Five Perspectives
en Law and Practice, 28 ARB. INT'L 19, 48 (2012).
53. Kim, supra note 5, at 415.
54. Chaisse, The Shifting Tectonics of International Investment Law, supra note 5, at 611.
55. Id. at 621.
56. Id.
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submit that it is simply too early to tell whether investor-state arbitration
will proliferate in the region.57
Few studies have been conducted examining claims brought by Asian
investors. Salomon and Friedrich observe that twenty-nine investment
arbitrations have been brought by investors in the East Asia and Pacific
region, twenty-two of which were under the ICSID Convention.58 Nineteen
investment arbitrations were based on an HA, two of these on the ASEAN
Agreements.59 They note that after a period of decline in the 1990s, where
only one claim was brought, there were nine new cases between 2000 and
2010, and sixteen cases from 2010 to 2015.60 Overall, 112 cases have been
initiated by Asian claimants, sixty-five of which (58 percent) have been
initiated in 2013 or later.61
In terms of subject-matter, oil, gas, and mining has traditionally been the
dominant sector for claims in Asia.62 But "2015 saw a, disproportionate
increase in the number of disputes in the electric power and other energy
sector[s] . . . perhaps a sign of industrial diversification in Asia . . ."63
In terms of outcome, a recent study concluded that states in Asia-Pacific
have won fourteen out of the forty-one disputes considered.- States in the
Middle East, North Africa, and Europe (and the former Soviet Union) are
found to win significantly more often than Asian states.65 Latest statistics,
however, indicate that Asian states have won twenty-one (55 percent) out of
the thirty-eight disputes that concluded with a decision on the merits.6 6
57. Junji Nakagawa, No More Negotiated Deals? Settlement of Trade and Investment Disputes in
East Asia, 10J. INT'L ECON. L. 837, 863 (2007).
58. Claudia T. Salomon & Sandra Friedrich, Investment Arbitration in East Asia and the Pacific,
16 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 800, 837 (2015).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 838.
61. Total cases initiated by Asian claimants, and since the end of 2012, Investment Dispute
Settlement Navigator, U.N. Com. ON TRADE & DEv. (UNCTAD), http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/ISDS (follow "advanced search" hyperlink; then enter claimant's nationality as
"Asia," dates of initiation as "1980 to 2017," and "Search"; see total number of cases loaded;
then compare to results from enter claimant's nationality as "Asia," dates of initiation as "2013
to 2017," and "Search") (last visited Sept. 25, 2017).
62. Lindsay & Andemariam, supra note 20, at 1.
63. Id.; See also Julien Chaisse, Renewables Re-energized? The Internationalization of Green Energy
Investment Rules and Disputes, 9 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 269 (2016).
64. Wellhausen, supra note 51, at 131.
65. Id. at 130.
66. Proportion of claims resulting in a decision won by Asian state respondents compared to
all decisions involving Asian state respondents, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, U.N.
CoNw. ON TRADE & DEv. (UNCTAD), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (Follow
"advanced search" hyperlink; then enter Respondent's nationality as "Asia," select "Decided in
favour of State" under "Status/Outcome of original proceedings," and "Search"; see total
number of cases loaded; then compare to results from enter Respondent's nationality as "Asia,"
select "Decided in favour of State," "Decided in favour of investor," and "Decided in favour of
neither party (liability found but no damages awarded)" under "Status/Outcome of original
proceedings," and "Search") (last visited Sept. 25, 2017).
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C. CONCERNS
The findings outlined above should lead one to conclude-or at least
seriously question-the perception that investor-state arbitration favours
investors over states. By contrast, however, there has been increasing
criticism of investment arbitration as being pro-investor. The popular press
has carried several (oft-misleading) articles on investor-state arbitration67
alleging, for instance, that secret trade courts68 pose a "real threat to the
national interest from the rich and powerful."69
Nearly every aspect of investment arbitration has come under criticism.
Concerns have been expressed about the biased interpretation of IIA
provisions in favour of investors, the lack of predictability and transparency
of arbitral proceedings, as well as the independence and impartiality of
arbitrators.70 Other serious concerns include suggesting that investment
arbitration has a chilling effect on a state's regulatory power,71 and that
foreign investors circumvent the operation of domestic law and national
courts through the process.72
Unfortunately, these criticisms have had a particular resonance in Asia.
Indonesia's termination of its IIAs, and India's new model BIT have both
been linked to the so-called pro-investor interpretation of IIA provisions by
investment tribunals73 Australia's earlier rejection of investment arbitration
67. See, e.g., Dan Ikenson, Eight Reasons to Purge Investor-State Dispute Settlement from Trade
Agreements, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2014), www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2014/03/04/eight-
reasons-to-purge-investor-state-dispute-settlement-from-trade-agreements/; The Arbitration
Game, THE EcONomisT (Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration.
68. Editorial, The Secret Trade Courts, N.Y. TIMs (Sept. 27, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/09/27/opinion/the-secret-trade-courts.html?mcubz0&module=arrowsNav&content
Collection=opinion&action=keypress&region=fixedLeft&pgtype=article.
69. George Monbiot, Opinion, From Obamacare to Trade, Superversion Not Subversion is the New
and Very Real Threat to the State, THE GuARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2013, 3:31 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/14/obamacare-trade-superversion-subversion-
threat-state.
70. See PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms,
Arbitrators, and Financiers Are Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom 71 (Helen Burley ed.,
Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute 2012), http://corporateeurope.
org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf; Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator
Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50
OSGOODE HALL L. J. 211, 211 (2012); Ikenson, supra note 67.
71. See Julia G. Brown, International Investment Agreements: Regulatory Chill in the Face of
Litigious Heat?, 3 WESTERNJ. LEGAL STou. 1 (2013) (noting that IAs "do indeed prevent some
countries from developing or enforcing effective environmental policies").
72. See generally STEPHAN W. SCHILL, REFORMING INVESTOR-STATE DisPUrE SETTLEMENT
(ISDS): CONCEPTUAL FRAMEwoRK AND OPTIONS FOR THE WAY FORWARD (E15Initiative
Geneva: Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev. (ICTSD) & World Econ. Forum eds., 2015),
http://el5initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/El5-Investment-Schill-Final.pdf.
73. See Press Release, Government of India, Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment
Treaty (Dec. 16, 2015, 8:10 PM) (available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/
PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133411) ("During the last few years, significant changes have occurred
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too can be traced to a belief that investment arbitration was biased towards
investors.74 A related concern is that of regulatory chill, with non-
governmental organizations fanning the belief that Asian states fail to enact
bona fide regulatory measures because of a perceived or actual threat of
investment arbitration.7s
It is not within the scope of this Article to respond to these criticisms; this
retort has been comprehensively done elsewhere76 and has even formed the
subject-matter of a survey conducted by the International Bar Association to
ascertain whether the criticism was justified.77 It suffices to say here that
most of these concerns are overstated. In any event, significant attempts
have been made to address them through the various reforms discussed
below.
IV. Recent Developments
The criticism of ISDS outlined above has led to an evolution of
international investment law-both in the substantive protections offered to
investors, as well as in the procedural framework of investment arbitration.78
While most developments are incremental and address only some aspects of
the system, others, such as the establishment of a permanent investment
court, result in an entirely new system for investor-state disputes.79
globally regarding BITs, in general, and investor-state dispute resolution mechanism i
particular."); Leon E. Trakman & Kunal Sharma, Why is Indonesia Terminating its Bilateral
Investment Treaties?, EAST AsiA F. (Sept. 20, 2014), www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/09/20/why-is-
indonesia-terminating-its-bilateral-investment-treaties.
74. Kyla Tienhaara & Patricia Ranald, Australia's rejection of Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
Four Potential Contributing Factors, INv. TREATY NEWS (July 12, 2011), www.iisd.org/itn/201 1/
07/12/australias-rejection-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-four-potential-contributing-
factors.
75. See generally Luke Nottage, The Rise and Possible Fall of Investor-State Arbitration in Asia: A
Skeptic's View of Australia's "Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement, TDM 5 (2011),
www.transnational-dispute-management.com URL: www.transnational-dispute-management.
com/article.asp?key=1767; Tietje et al., The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (2014); Study prepared for the Minister of
Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign affairs, The Netherlands;
UNCHR, High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights, Trade and Investment (2003)
UN doc F/CN.4/Sub.2//2003/9, 35.
76. See, for instance, Gloria Maria Alvarez et al., A Response to the Criticism against ISDS by
EFIIA, 33 J. I-r'L ARB. 1 (2016).
77. INT'L BAR AsS'N SuscoMi. ON INv.TREATY ARBTTRATION, REPORT ON THE
SUBCOMMITTEE'S INvESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION SURVEY 1 (2016).
78. See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016, at 108-116, U.N. Sales No. E.16.
II.D.4 (2016); See generally UNCTAD, TAKING STOCK OF IIA REFORM (Mar. 2016), http://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb20l6d3_en.pdf.
79. See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016, at 115, U.N. Sales No. E.16. II.D.4
(2016); UNCTAD, TAKING STOCK OF IIA REFORM, at 10, (Mar. 2016), http://unctad.org/en/
PubhlicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2016d3_en.pdf.
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These developments are particularly relevant for Asia-Pacific for several
reasons. First, the backlasho against investment arbitration has been severe
in this region, with several Asian states substantially reforming their HAs as a
result.81 Others are either delaying ratification of ILAs,82 renegotiating
them,83 or terminating them altogether.84 Second, by dominating global
investment flows and entering into an increasing number of HAs, "Asian
actors are in a good position to translate their economic importance into
global-rule-making power."ss Stephen Schill continues, "there is little doubt
that Asian countries . . . are becoming focal points in rule-making in
international investment law."86 Third, Asian states are already involved in a
significant number of investment disputes that run into billions of dollars
and concern increasingly sensitive issues.87 Some developments, such as
transparency and third-party participation, could, thus, be usefully adopted
in on-going proceedings to quell criticism that investment arbitration is a
closed process. Fourth, the number of claims against Asian states is expected
to rise in the future.88 Asian states should, thus, pay close attention to recent
80. See generally Malcom Langford et al., Backlash and State Strategies in International
Investment Law, in THE CHANGING PRACTICES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: SoVEREIGNTY, LAW
AND POLITICS IN A GLOBALISING WORLD (Tanja Aalberts & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen
eds.) (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2704344 ("providing a historical overview
of the narrative of 'legitimacy crisis' in the field of investment arbitration"); see generally
MICHAEL WAIBEL ET AL., THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Michael
Waibel et al. ed., 2010).
81. Sri Lanka announced its intention to move away from traditional IIAs, inter alia because of
the "bitter lessons" learned from investment arbitration. See Champika Malalgoda, Dir.
Research & Policy Advocacy Dep't, Bd. of Inv. of Sri Lanka, Speaking at the World Investment
Forum 2014: IIA Conference (Oct. 16, 2014) (Transcript available, http://unctad-worldinvest
mentforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Malalgoda.pdf). The same is the case with India,
which substantially revised its earlier model HA in light of the ruling against it in the White
Industries arbitration. See Press Info. Bureau Gov't of India, supra note 73.
82. See generally Yoram Haftel & Alexander Thompson, Delayed Ratification: The Domestic Fate
of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 67 INT'L ORG. 355 (2013).
83. This is the case with India, which has begun renegotiating 47 IIAs. See AP, India Wants
New Foreign Investment Pacts to Limit Lawsuits, INDIAN ExPREss (July 11, 2016), http://
indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/india-wants-new-foreign-investment-pacts-
to-limit-lawsuits-2906478/.
84. This is the case with Indonesia. See, e.g., Ben Bland & Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to
Terminate More Than 60 Bilateral Investment Treaties, FIN. TIEs (Mar. 26, 2014), www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/3755clb2-b4e2-11e3-af92-00144feabdcO.html#axzz42JTevYOq; Leon E. Trakman &
Kunal Sharma, Indonesia's Termination of the Netherlands-Indonesia BIT: Broader Implications in the
Asia-Pacific?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Aug. 21, 2014), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/08/
2 1/indonesias-termination-of-the-netherlands-indonesia-bit-broader-implications-in-the-asia-
pacific/.
85. Stephen W. Schill, Changing Geography: Prospects for Asian Actors as Global Rule-Makers in
International Investment Law, COLUM. FDI PERSP., No. 177, July 4, 2016, at 1.
86. Id.
87. Australia, for instance, recently won a case against Phillip Morris. Phillip Morris Asia Ltd.
v. The Commonwealth of Australia, 12 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012); see generally Joongi, supra note 5.
88. See Julien Chaisse, Assessing the Exposure ofAsian States to Investment Claims, 6 CoNTEMP.
ASIA ARB. J. 187, 205-06 (2013).
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developments to make sure that the oft-competing state and investor
interests are adequately balanced.
It is not possible to review all the current developments in this chapter.
Instead, we touch on a few procedural developments that will likely have the
strongest repercussions in Asia. Some of these developments-such as
controlling treaty interpretation-already exist within the Asian investment
arbitration framework.89 Others, however, are notably absent.
A. CONTROL OF INTERPRETATION
As we mentioned above, one of the serious criticisms of the current
investment arbitration framework is that investment tribunals interpret IIAs
not precisely in accordance with what states had in mind when they
negotiated and entered into those IIAs.9o Methymaki and Tzanakopoulos
argue that at the time states entered into HAs, they were not fully "aware at
the time of the implications that the structure and language of the treaty
provisions would have in practice."9'
To address this concern, recent HAs contemplate joint interpretations by
the states party to the IIA in question.92 Arbitral tribunals are bound by such
interpretations, although whether an interpretation would also apply to a
pre-existing dispute remains to be seen.93 Several states including Canada,
Chile, Mexico, the United States, and the European Union now include
express provisions in their IIAs allowing for binding joint interpretations of
the IIA.-
89. See Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, art. 27
¶ 3, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2013/economic/afta/AANZFTA/
Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20AANZFTA-pdf ("A joint decision of the Parties,
declaring their interpretation of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a tribunal,
and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that joint decision.");
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, art. 40 T 3, Feb. 26, 2009, http://
www.asean.org/storage/images/2013/economic/aia/ACIAFinalText_26%2OFeb%202009.pdf
("A joint decision of the Member States, declaring their interpretation of a provision of this
Agreement shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must
be consistent with the joint decision.").
90. See generally Margie-Lys Jamie, Relying Upon Parties'Interpretation i Treaty-Based Investor-
State Dispute Settlement: Filling in the Gaps in International Investment Agreements, 46 GEo. J.
INT'L L. 262 (2014).
91. See generally Eleni Methymaki & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Masters of Puppets? Reassertion
of Control Througb Joint Investment Treaty Interpretation, REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE
INVESTMENT TREATY REGImE 156 (Andreas Kulick ed., 2017).
92. See generally David Gaukrodger, The Legal Framework Applicable to Joint Interpretative
Agreements of Investment Treaties (OECD Working Papers on International Investment No. 1,
2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jm3xgt6f29w-en.
93. Methymaki & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 91, at 163-64.
94. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., art. 8.31, 8.44, Oct. 30,
2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf; Central
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It is heartening to note that some Asian IIAs, such as the ASEAN
Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) between ten major Asian
nations,95 and the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZ-FTA),
already contain such provisions.96 In fact, some Asian states have gone a step
further by not only controlling the interpretation of the IIA, but also
controlling its application. For instance, under the China-Australia FTA
(ChAFTA), if an investor challenges a regulatory measure, the respondent
state is permitted to issue a 'public welfare notice' specifying why it believes
that the measure falls within this exception.97 After which, the arbitration
proceedings are suspended and a ninety-day consultation period with the
other treaty party is triggered.98 If the state parties agree that the challenged
measure is excluded from the FTA, their decision would bind the investment
tribunal.99 If the treaty parties are unable to agree whether the measure is
excluded within the ninety-day period, the matter would be decided by the
investment tribunal, which is not to draw any adverse inference from the
non-issuance of a public welfare notice by the respondent, or from the
absence of any decision between the respondent and the non-disputing Party
as to whether a measure is an exception.-o
B. COUNTERCLAIMS
Investment arbitration is commonly perceived as being biased towards
investors.'0 It is assumed that the state must always adopt a defensive
position when faced with an investment claiml02 and can, at best, only hope
to defeat the claims of an investor.103 Recent developments, however, are
altering this perceived asymmetry, with counterclaims becoming
increasingly common. Twenty-eight counterclaims are known to have been
95. ASEAN, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, http://asean.org/asean/asean-
member-states/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
96. AANZFTA & ACIA, supra note 89.
97. Anthea Roberts & Richard Braddock, Protecting Public Welfare Regulation Through Joint
Treaty Party Control: a ChAFTA Innovation, BLOG. EUR. 3. INT'L L. (June 21, 2016), https://
www.ejiltalk.org/category/international-tribunals/investor-state-arbitration-tribunals/page/
2 /
(talking about contents of ChAFTA article 9.11.5).
98. See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of
the People's Republic of China, Austl.-China, art. 9.11.5-6, June 17, 2015, A.T.S. 15
[hereinafter China-Australia Free Trade Agreement/ FTA or ChAFTA].
99. See id. at art. 9.18.3.
100. Id. at art. 9.11.8.
101. See generally MICHAEL WAIBEL ET AL., The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration:
Perceptions and Reality, THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION xxxvii-li (Michael
Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
102. See Pierre Lalive & Laura Halonen, On the Availability of Counterclaims in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 2 CZECH Y.B. INT'L L. 141, 154-55 (2011).
103. Id.
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raised so far, thirteen of which have been filed within the past six years.04
Further, most recent treaties contemplate counterclaims.
The Asian experience with counterclaims is somewhat mixed. On the one
hand, four Asian states have initiated counterclaims, with Indonesia so far
being the only successful counterclaimant in its dispute with a Saudi Arabian
investor.05 Further, provided certain conditions are met, the Trans Pacific
Partnership (TPP) allows counterclaims, o6 as does the Agreement for the
Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments Among Member
States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which comprises a
large number of Asian states.107 On the other hand, most Asian HAs do not
contemplate counterclaims, at least expressly.108
C. TRANSPARENCY
A serious concern voiced about the existing ISDS system is the lack of
transparency. Recently, however, there has been a global movement
towards increased transparency and third-party participation in investment
arbitration,109 even among those states that have been traditionally opposed
to transparency. For instance, Ecuador now regularly publishes information
104. See Ina C. Popova & Fiona Poon, From Perpetual Respondent to Aspiring Counterclaimant?
State Counterclaims in the New Wave of Investment Treaties, 2 BCDR INT'L ARB. REv. 223,
254-59 (2015).
105. See Al-Warraq v. Indon., UNCITRAL, Final Award, 141-42 (Arb. Trib. Dec. 15, 2014),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4l64.pdf.
106. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Investment, art 9.19.2, Feb. 4, 2016, https://
ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf [hereinafter TPP] ("When the
claimant submits a claim pursuant to paragraph 1(a)(i)(B), 1(a)(i)(C), 1(b)(i)(B), or 1(b)(i)(C), the
respondent may make a counterclaim in connection with the factual and legal basis of the claim
or rely on a claim for the purpose of a set off against the claimant.").
107. See Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments Among Member
States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, art. 17.1.1.a, Sept. 23, 1986, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2399.
108. See generally TRIsHA MYTRA & RAHUL DONDE, Claims and Counterclaims under Asian
Multilateral Investment Treaties, JUDGING THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INVESTMENT LAW: MODERN SovEREIGNTY, THE LAW THE EcoNoncs 105, 105-26 (Lefla
Choukroune ed., 2016) (for a review of counterclaims in Asian IIAs).
109. See generally TRANSPARENCY: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTs II, U.N. Sales No. E.11. II.D.16 (2012); GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-
KOHLER, Non-Disputing State Submissions in Investment Arbitration: Resurgence of Diplomatic
Protection?, DIPLOMATIC AND JUDICIAL MEANS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 305, 308 (Laurence
Boisson de Chazournes et al. eds., 2013).
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about progress of its investment cases on its government websites.11o A
similar policy is being followed by the Czech Republic.",
In 2014, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Investor-State
Arbitration came into effect. These Rules apply to all UNCITRAL
arbitrations initiated under HAs concluded on or after April 1, 2014, unless
the Parties to the IIA have agreed otherwise.112 They also apply to
arbitrations under existing IAs, provided the parties to those treaties
consent to their application.113 The Rules chart new ground concerning
public access to ISDS.114 They cover issues ranging from disclosure of the
initiation of arbitral proceedings, to specifying the documents to be
disclosed, to requiring open hearings and publication of awards.n1s Further,
the Rules are not limited to arbitrations conducted under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules; they are available for both institutional and other ad hoc
investment arbitration proceedings.116 The Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce, for instance, has issued a practice note which calls for the
application of the Transparency Rules in investment arbitration.117
In another noteworthy development, in 2015, states agreed on a
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration
(Transparency Convention)is The Transparency Convention was designed
to extend the scope of application of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules
by providing a mechanism by which states can agree to the application of the
Transparency Rules to UNCITRAL arbitrations instituted under pre-April
2014 IIAs."9 While only Mauritius, Switzerland, and Canada have ratified
110. See Julia Calvert, State Strategies for the Defense of Domestic Interests in Investor-State
Arbitration, INv. TREATY NEWS, INT'L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEv. (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.
iisd.org/itn/2016/02/29/state-strategies-for-the-defence-of-domestic-interests-in-investor-
state-arbitration-julia-calvert/#edn2.
111. See generally Luke Eric Peterson & Zoe Williams, The Czech Republic: Updates on Fifteen
Investment Treaty Disputes, INv. ARB. REP. (May 24, 2016), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/
the-czech-republic-updates-on-fifteen-investment-treaty-disputes/.
112. See UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE





115. See generally id.
116. See id. at 5.
117. See Mauritius Convention and UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, ARB. INST. STOCKHOLM
CHAMBER COM. (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/7
2 8 19/sec-application-of-
mauritius-convention-and-uncitral-rules-on-transparency.pdf.
118. See U.N. CONVENTION ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION, G.A. Res. 69/116, U.N. Doc. A/69/496 (Dec. 10 2014), http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf.
119. See id.
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the Transparency Convention so far,120 more States are likely to do so in the
near future. Twenty-one countries have signed the Transparency
Convention to date, but none from the Asia-Pacific.121
It is now a foregone conclusion that investment arbitration should be
conducted in an open, transparent manner. Given the public dimension of
investment disputes and the growing interest of civil society, Asian states
would do well to make their investment disputes more transparent. While a
few Asian states have taken steps in this direction, others are lagging.122
D. STATE-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Most IIAs contain two dispute resolution clauses, one permitting investor-
state arbitration for investment disputes and the other permitting state-to-
state arbitration for disputes concerning the treaty's interpretation and/or
application.123 State-state dispute resolution provisions are not commonly
used to resolve investor-state disputes. This position has, however, changed
recently with state-state dispute resolution emerging as a viable option
through which states can exercise greater control over the interpretation and
application of disputed IIA provisions.124 States have initiated claims against
their counterparty in response to investor-state disputes that they were
facing at the time. For example, in Peru v. Chile, state-state arbitration was
initiated to define the temporal limits of the Peru-Chile BIT.125 Similarly, in
Ecuador v. United States, a tribunal was called on to decide the scope of the
states' obligations under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT.126
Some Asian IIAs include state-state dispute resolution as the only dispute
resolution mechanism-not one in addition to ISDS. For example,
Australia's agreements with the United States and Malaysia, and the
120. See Status United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration (New York, 2014), UNCITRAL.ORG, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral
texts/arbitration/2014TransparencyConvention status.htmI (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
121. See id.
122. See Zhao Jun Lin Yun, The Transparency Reform in International Investment Arbitration and
China's Reactions, 44J. ZHEJIANG U. 150, 150-63 (2014); Locknie Hsu, Asian Treaty-Makers and
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Negotiating with a Wary Eye, 5(2) CowrEMP AsIA ARB. J. 243, 253
(2012) (For instance, while the ACIA and the AANZ contain transparency obligations, China is
more reluctant.).
123. Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of
Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 1 (2014).
124. See MICHELE PROTESTA, State-to-State Dispute Settlement Pursuant o Bilateral Investment
Treaties: Is there Potential?, INTERNATIONAL COURTs AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TULLIo TREVEs 753, 767 (Nerina Boschiero et
al. eds., T.M.C. Asser Press 2013).
125. See Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties,
INT'L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEv. ii, 10 (Oct. 2014), https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/
publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-treaties.pdf (Discussing
the case).
126. See Ecuador v. U.S., PCA Case No. 2012-5, Request for Arbitration, 1 2 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2011); see generally Roberts, supra note 123.
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Philippines' with Japan, subject all investment disputes to state-state dispute
settlement.
Asian states should review and consider state-state dispute resolution
mechanisms in their existing (and new) investment treaties to ascertain
whether, and how, these provisions can be effectively used in an investor-
state context.
E. APPEALS MECHANISM
Decisions of arbitral tribunals in investment arbitration are final, and
usually subject only to very limited grounds of review.127 As mentioned
above, the current ISDS system has been criticised as there is no corrective
mechanism if tribunals get their decisions wrong.128 The ability to appeal
decisions was one of the key concerns raised by both businesses and non-
governmental organizations.129
In this context, the establishment of an appellate mechanism has regained
currency.5 0 The EU-Vietnam FTA as well as the Canada-EU FTA both
contemplate the creation of an Investment Court (examined below), as well
as an appeal tribunal. Other HAs also contemplate the creation of an
appellate mechanism under which the correctness of a decision of an arbitral
tribunal can be contested. The US-Singapore FTA contemplates the
creation of an appeals mechanism,131 as does India's new model BIT.132 The
TPP refers to the possibility of an "appellate mechanism for reviewing
awards rendered by investor-State dispute settlement tribunals [being]
developed in the future."133 This possibility is also left open in the ChAFTA
under which China and Australia are to commence negotiations for an
127. See generally ENFORCEMENT OF INvEsTM:ENT TREATY ARBITRATION AWARDS: A GLOBAL
GUIDE (Julien Fouret et al. eds., 2015) (In the ICSID context, grounds for annulment are
specified in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. In non-ICSID context, the grounds specified
in Article V of the New York Convention would apply.).
128. See Investment in TTIP and Beyond-the path for reform: Enhancing the Right to Regulate and
Moving from Current Ad Hoc Arhitration Towards an Investment Court, EuR. COMMISSION 1, 8
(May 5, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF.
129. See id.
130. See generally ANTONIo R. PARRA, Advancing Reform at ICSID, RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-
STATE DISPTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 569, 569-83 (jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds.,
2015); see also Katia Yannaca-Small, Improving the System ofInvestor-State Dispute Settlement: The
OECD Governments' Perspective, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
DISPUTES 223, 223-28 (Karl P. Sauvant & Michael Chiswick-Patterson eds., 2008) (Proposals
for an appeals mechanism were considered by ICSID in 2004 and by the OECD in 2005.).
131. See United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Sing.-U.S., art. 15.19.10, May 6,
2003, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset__upload fi e
708_036.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Singapore FTA].
132. See Bilateral Investment Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of India and
-, art. 29, https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master image/Model%20Text%20for
%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf [hereinafter India Model BIT].
133. See TPP, Investment, art 9.23.11, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-
Final-Text-Investment.pdf.
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appellate and review mechanism for hearing questions of law arising out of
arbitral awards issued under that Agreement.134 Thus, "there is now a real
possibility that some kind of regional investment appeals body will be
established in the coming years."135
F. INVESTMENT CORT
Another development of considerable importance is the Investment Court
System (ICS), which would altogether replace the current investment
arbitration framework. This system is contemplated in the EU-Vietnam
FTA as well as the Canada-EU FTA.136
Under this approach, amicable resolution is favoured and settlement can
be agreed at any time, including after arbitration proceedings have
commenced.137 Where a dispute cannot "be resolved [amicably], a claimant
... shall submit a request for consultations to the other party" which must
usually take place within sixty days.138 Six months after the submission of
this request for consultations, the claimant can submit a claim to the
Tribunal of First Instance (the Tribunal).139
In the EU-Vietnam FTA, the Tribunal is composed of nine judges,
appointed on a permanent basis, with three judges being nationals of a
Member State of the EU, three judges being nationals of Vietnam, and a
further three judges being nationals of third countries.-o Three judges hear
each individual dispute, with one judge from the EU, one from Vietnam, and
one from a third country.'4 '
The Tribunal is to issue its "award within eighteen months of the date of
submission of the claim."142 Any party dissatisfied with the award may
approach the Appellate Tribunal on specific grounds, including errors in the
application or interpretation of applicable law and "manifest errors" in the
establishment of the facts, including the establishment of relevant domestic
134. See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of
the People's Republic of China, Austl.-China, art. 9.23, June 17, 2015, A.T.S. 15 [hereinafter
China-Australia Free Trade Agreement/ FTA or ChAFTA].
135. ISDS in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional Snap-Shot, 19 INT'L TRADE & Bus. L. REv. 20, 34-35
(2016).
136. See Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, EU-Viet., Investment, art. 14.6, Jan. 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2016/february/tradoc_154210.pdf [hereinafter EU-Vietnam FTA]; see also Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement, EU-Can., Investment, art. 8.27-28, Oct. 30, 2016, http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/ [hereinafter CETA] (Both
these treaties are awaiting domestic approvals and subsequent ratification.).
137. See EU-Vietnam FTA, Investment, Annex Agreement between Member States of the
European Union and Vietnam, §3.2 at art. 3.
138. See id. §3.2 at art 4.
139. See id. §3.3 at art 7.1.
140. See id. §3.4. at arts. 12.2, .5.
141. See id. at art. 12.6.
142. See id. §3.5. at art. 27.6.
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law.143 The Appellate Tribunal is empowered to uphold, modify, or reverse
an award.-
The reception that the ICS will have in Asia-Pacific is yet unknown. In
fact, some prominent Asian commentators have expressed their strong
discontent with the ICS.45 But as the EU and Canada have expressed their
strong support for the proposal, '6 and as they are both currently negotiating
investment agreements with important Asian states,147 it is likely that-at
least for some Asian states-ICS will replace the traditional investment
arbitration framework.
V. Conclusion
The Asia-Pacific region is in the midst of unprecedented economic
growth. Foreign investment inflows and outflows are at historic highs.
Investment protection instruments like IIAs continue to be critical to the
investment framework of the region. In addition, the G20 Principles
explicitly place foreign investment very high in terms of international
economic policy by indicating that the G20 has "the objective of (i) fostering
an open, transparent and conducive global policy environment for
investment, (ii) promoting coherence in national and international
investment policymaking, and (iii) promoting inclusive economic growth
and sustainable development."148 The combination of favorable regional and
global drivers suggest hat investment flows and investment policies will gain
in importance in the years to come as a key driver of the world economy.
A vast majority of Asian IIAs provide for investment arbitration, both as
an element of the regional trade and investment treaty architecture as well as
143. See EU-Vietnam FTA, Investment, Annex Agreement between Member States of the
European Union and Vietnam, §3.5 at art. 28.1.
144. See id. at arts. 28.2-.3.
145. See e.g., M. SoRNARAJAH, An International Investment Court: Panacea or Purgatory?,
COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES, COLOM. CTR. SUSTAINABLE INv. No. 180 (Aug. 15, 2016),
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-180-Sornarajah-FINAL.pdf.
146. See Joint Statement: Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), EUR.
CoMsNUsIoN (Feb. 29, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-STATEMENT-16-446
en.htrn.
147. See Canada-India Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement Negotiations,
GLOBAL AFFAIRS CAN., http://international.gc.ca/trade-FNcommerce/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/india-inde/fipa-apiebackground-contexte.aspx?lang=eng (last
visited Sept. 22, 2017); see also EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
and-regions/countries/chinal (last visited Sept. 22, 2017). (For instance, Canada and India are
presently negotiating a 'Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement,' as are the
EU and China.).
148. See Annex Ill. G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking, UNCTAD.ORG,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/Annex%20E1%20G20%20Guid
ing%20Principles%20for%20GIobal%20Investment%2OPolicymaking.pdf (last visited Sept.
22, 2017).
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a practical means for resolving disputes. Nearly 21 percent of all investment
disputes involve Asian states, and these numbers are likely to rise.149
Investment arbitration has, however, been facing a considerable backlash,
which is leading to an adjustment in investment disciplines as well as dispute
settlement procedures. This backlash has been particularly significant in
Asia, with some Asian states exiting from the system altogether and others
altering it in material ways.50
Several reforms to the present investment arbitration framework have
been proposed to reaffirm state control while at the same time retain
investor interest. These reforms are particularly significant for Asia, and it is
heartening to note that some Asian states are adopting a more refined
approach towards investment arbitration.151 Asia-Pacific is, however, lagging
in some respects. Having considerable investment jurisprudence before
them, Asian states are uniquely placed now to benefit from the experiences
of others.152 Besides, the increase of Asia-centric investment flows places
Asian states in an increasingly important position to determine the future of
global investment governance. This is certainly an exciting time for those
dealing with international investment law, particularly in the Asia-Pacific
region.
149. Sources: UNCTAD, 'Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator' Investment Policy Hub
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry>; ICSID, 'Cases' International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, <https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/
cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx> (both accessed 22 Oct. 2017).
150. See Emma Lindsay & Bieta Andemariam, International Investment Arbitration in Asia: Year
in Review 2014, BRYANCAVE.COM 1, 4, https://www.bryancave.com/images/content/6/4/v
2 /
64874/Arbitration-Asia-YIR-FINAL.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
151. See Stephan W. Schill, Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Conceptual
Framework and Options for the Way Forward, E15INrrlATIVE.ORG (July 2015), http://el5initia
tive.org/publications/reforming-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-conceptual-framework-
and-options-for-the-way-forward/.
152. See Stephan W. Schill, Special Issue: Dawn of an Asian Century in International Investment
Law?, J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 765, 771 (2015), http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/
content/journals/10.1163/22119000-01606012.
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